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Abstract. The recent fiscal austerity experiments undertaken in the states of Kansas and 
Wisconsin have generated considerable policy interest. Using a variety of identification 
approaches within a difference-in-differences framework and examining a wide range of 
economic indicators, this paper assesses whether the experiments have spurred growth in the 
states as promised by the governors and legislatures which enacted them into law. The overall 
conclusion from the paper is that the fiscal experiments did not spur growth, and if anything, 
harmed state economic performance. Among the identification approaches used, the Synthetic 
Control Method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al., 2010) is demonstrated to provide 
the most compelling evidence. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the academic evidence on whether state income taxation affects economic growth is 
mixed (Bartik, 1991; Wasylenko, 1997; Buss, 2001;  Rickman, 2013; Yu and Rickman, 2013),  a 
number of  states have recently reduced or considered reducing their personal and business taxes 
(Wall Street Journal, 2012). Dramatic reductions in taxes and cuts in government spending were 
the centerpieces of two recent controversial experiments in economic policy in the states of 
Kansas and Wisconsin. The Kansas and Wisconsin experiments began with the election of their 
Republican governors in 2010, Sam Brownback and Scott Walker, respectively, with both taking 
office January 2011. Governor Walker survived a recall election in Wisconsin during 2012, and 
both were re-elected in 2014.  
 The policies enacted after the election of the two governors were promoted as a means to 
stimulate growth in the state economies (Citizens for Tax Justice, 2012). They likely pleased the 
Republican Party base in each state and contributed to the reelection of both governors 
(Fredriksson et al., 2013). The attention surrounding the enactment of the fiscal austerity 
measures though generated considerable interest in their subsequent effects. To be sure, the 
performances of Kansas and Wisconsin economies have since often been compared to those of 
their neighbors, namely Nebraska and Minnesota, respectively. Neither Minnesota nor Nebraska 
enacted policies similar to those of Wisconsin and Kansas, making them potentially useful 
comparison states.   
Wisconsin and Minnesota have been argued to be of similar size and economic structure 
(Chin, 2014), while also having similar climate and topography (Barnard-Schaber, 2015). One 
difference that has been noted is that Minnesota has its major university and capital in its major 
metropolitan area (Thompson, 2016). Wisconsin’s economic performance has been reported as 
falling below Minnesota’s economic performance since 2011 according to growth in total 
nonfarm employment, real gross state product and government production and employment 
(Chinn, 2014). In fact, Wisconsin’s job growth fell far short of Governor Walker’s pledge for job 
growth during his first term (Chinn, 2014). 
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The performance of the Kansas economy has mostly been compared to Nebraska’s. The 
two states have been argued to have similar median income, per capita income, percentage of 
population in urban areas, and similar area under cultivation, though Kansas has a larger 
population (Fox, 2016). Both states also have a major East-West interstate. But Kansas ranked 
10th in crude oil production, while Nebraska ranked 22
nd 
(Fox, 2016); Kansas also possesses a 
sizeable aerospace sector (Chinn, 2015).  
The performance of the Kansas economy similarly has lagged that of Nebraska since 
2011. In fact, the gap in total nonfarm employment growth between Kansas and Nebraska 
widened each year since 2011, registering losses the last half of 2015, a fact which is not altered 
by removing oil-related job growth in the two states (Fox, 2016). Drought conditions and 
aerospace employment losses in Kansas also have been argued to not explain the relatively lower 
economic growth of Kansas (Chinn, 2014; 2015).  
Lower growth in Kansas and Wisconsin post-2011 though is not sufficient to conclude 
that the economic experiments failed. What needs to be demonstrated is that the relative growth 
is lower (or at least not higher) than what would have occurred without the experiments. Post-
treatment growth differences need to be compared to pre-treatment growth differences for 
control units that represent the baselines without the experiments. Therefore, we use a variety of 
empirical identification approaches that have been applied in the literature to compare the 
economic performances of Kansas and Wisconsin to those of other states since 2011 that 
represent the baseline.  
There have been few studies on the effects of the party of the U.S. state governor and 
labor market outcomes. In a study of Democrat and Republican governors from 1941-2002, 
Leigh (2008) found that under Democrat governors states tended to experience higher median 
after-tax income, lower after-tax income inequality and lower unemployment rates; few 
differences in policy settings were found though between Democrat and Republican governors, 
suggesting they behaved more in accordance with the median voter theorem than ideology. Over 
the period 1951-2004, Chang et al. (2009) found that growth rates of real per capita income and 
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government spending tended to be higher with Democrat governors. Beland (2015) found a 
decrease in the annual earnings gap between whites and blacks under Democrat governors but 
not in weekly and hourly earnings.  
We restrict the analysis to Kansas and Wisconsin because they had among the five largest 
personal income tax cuts since 2010 (Leachman and Mazerov, 2015) and a broad range of 
additional policies were driven strongly by ideology. There also can be heterogeneous responses 
to policy changes across time. In particular, the effects may have been stronger during a period 
of weak recovery following the Great Recession (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). 
We first compare the performances of Wisconsin with Minnesota and Kansas with 
Nebraska, pre- and post-2011, in difference-in-differences (DID) analysis of several economic 
indicators. Several economic indicators are examined to obtain a more accurate and holistic 
assessment of the relative economic performances (Partridge and Rickman, 1999). Across all the 
indicators, however, we find that Minnesota generally did not match well with Wisconsin and 
Nebraska did not match well with Kansas during the pre-treatment period, casting doubt on the 
use of Minnesota and Nebraska as the respective comparison states. Likewise, in using counties 
along the Kansas-Nebraska border and the Minnesota-Wisconsin border to control for potential 
differences in compositions at the state level in culture, geographic location and topography we 
similarly find that pre-treatment growth noticeably differed between the counties along the two 
borders for most economic indicators. We then apply the industry shift-share method at the state 
level within a DID framework to total employment to control for pre- and post-industry 
composition effects. Industry composition appears to explain the pre-treatment difference in total 
employment growth between Wisconsin and Minnesota, but not the difference between Kansas 
and Nebraska; the shift-share method also has limited usefulness because it can only be used for 
economic indicators with sector detail. 
Finally, we then examine the economic performances of Kansas and Wisconsin since 
2011 using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to construct counterfactual comparisons, or 
synthetic control groups. In SCM, the control groups are obtained as weighted–averages of 
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comparison states; the weights are applied to states based on pre-intervention characteristics in 
the process of matching pre-intervention paths of the indicator variables between the state of 
interest and the synthetic control group (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). The 
respective synthetic control groups are demonstrated to have similarities to Kansas and 
Wisconsin and to match pre-2011 trends in the key economic indicators. Difference-in-
differences are calculated for Kansas and Wisconsin and their synthetic controls. 
In the next section, we discuss the policy changes enacted after the election of the 
Governors of Kansas and Wisconsin in 2010. Because of the respective comparisons to 
Minnesota and Nebraska we also discuss their policy experiences during the same period. In 
Section 3, we present the results of the analysis. Rather than spur growth, the overall conclusion 
from the analysis is that if anything, the experiments in fiscal austerity harmed the state 
economies. We also demonstrate that the Synthetic Control Method provides the most 
compelling evidence, suggesting its usefulness in regional policy evaluation. 
2. Policy Comparisons 
According to the National Council of State Actions Database,1 immediately following Governor 
Walker taking office, Wisconsin cut taxes for businesses in the 2011-2013 budget (reducing 
corporate income taxes), reduced personal income collections through changing deductions etc., 
cut funding for K-12 education, limited how much property tax could be raised, raised college 
tuition 5.5%, changed collective bargaining process for most public employees, rejected federal 
health care funds for Medicaid expansion and rejected (federal) stimulus funds for high-speed 
rail. In the 2013-2015 budget corporate taxes were further reduced, some fees were raised, while 
large reductions in personal income taxes were enacted through reduced rates. 
Correspondingly, following Governor Sam Brownback taking office, Kansas rejected 
Medicaid expansion, collapsed the three-bracket structure of personal income taxes 3.5, 6.25 and 
6.45 percent into two brackets of 3.0 and 4.9 percent, repealed  several income tax credits, 
                                                          
1
 http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-tax-actions-database.aspx 
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exempted certain non-wage business income of "pass-through" entities and increased the 
standard deduction for head of household and married taxpayers filing jointly. In 2013, for fiscal 
year 2014, the bottom bracket of 3.0 percent was reduced to 2.7 percent and the top bracket of 
4.9 percent is reduced to 4.8 percent, while many deductions were reduced or repealed 
altogether, some of which had been raised during the previous budget. 
In terms of policy, Minnesota pursued a different policy path during the period with the 
election of Mark Dayton, a Democrat, as governor. Minnesota enacted a sharp increase in taxes 
for the top 2 percent of household incomes, expanded unionization, froze college tuition, 
increased the minimum wage, boosted primary education spending and established all-day 
kindergarten (Patterson, 2015). In 2013, additional changes enacted to be implemented in 
subsequent years included modifications that brought in additional corporate and business taxes, 
raised fees and miscellaneous taxes, authorized a new personal income tax bracket at 9.85 
percent on married and joint filers earning $250,000 of taxable income, expanded sales tax base 
(NCSL State Actions Database) and expanded Medicaid coverage2. 
In contrast to Kansas, Nebraska enacted few changes in fiscal policy (National Council of 
State Actions Database). In 2011, small effects on personal income tax collections occurred 
through an assessment on nursing home beds and a personal income tax credit for start-up high 
growth ventures. In 2012, personal income tax rates were slightly reduced across most brackets 
(a $7.7 million reduction). In 2013, Nebraska eliminated the state alternative minimum tax, 
increased the income tax credit for contributions to education savings plans, and provided a 
corporate tax credit from renewable electricity production. 
3. Analysis 
The wide range of policy decisions enacted by each governor and legislature makes it 
difficult to use computable general equilibrium or other structural models to assess the effects of 
the policies. In addition, dramatic shifts in policy also cause considerable uncertainty that may 
                                                          
2
 https://www.healthinsurance.org/minnesota-medicaid/ 
6 
 
adversely affect economic activity in the state (Shelton and Falk, 2016) that are difficult to 
capture in a structural model. Therefore, we attempt to empirically estimate the effects of 
policies pursued early in each governor’s first term using alternative identification approaches 
within a difference-in-differences (DID) framework. 
Following Partridge and Rickman (1999; 2003), we examine a wide range of economic 
indicators to assess overall economic performance. Any one indicator may contain significant 
measurement error and interpretation of a single indicator may be misleading. Rising wages and 
per capita income at the regional level could reflect either relatively strong labor demand growth 
or alternatively relatively weak labor supply growth (Partridge and Rickman, 1999). The 
combination of indicators that best explains relative economic performance also can vary across 
states (Partridge and Rickman, 2003). We examine ten economic indicators at the state level:  
total employment, per capita income and real gross state product from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis; total nonfarm wage and salary employment from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), the labor force participation 
rate and the unemployment rate from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; population, the poverty 
rate and median household income from the U.S. Census Bureau; and the average housing price 
from the Federal Housing Finance Authority. 
 Because of relative strengths and weaknesses of various empirical approaches to 
identification, we implement several approaches that have been applied in the literature. We first 
apply the DID to the ten economic indicators at the state level. Comparison states−Minnesota for 
Wisconsin and Nebraska for Kansas−however, may not necessarily match well with application 
of DID. Secondly, we apply DID for counties along the borders of each pair of states for 
potentially better matching. Yet, the counties along the borders of comparison states may not be 
representative of the states, nor represent much of the economic activity of the states. Thirdly, we 
apply the shift-share method long used in regional science (Loveridge and Selting, 1998). The 
shift-share method controls for the effects of differing industry compositions between the states, 
both pre- and post-treatment. But there may be factors other than industry composition affecting 
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the efficacy of the matched-comparisons. Finally, we use Synthetic Control Method (SCM) to 
construct control groups (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). SCM does not 
require any single state to be a good match for comparison to the treated state. Rather, in SCM a 
weighted-average of states is constructed with the weights chosen based on affinities with the 
treatment state and pre-treatment matching in the outcome variable. We do not consider panel 
estimation because of the wide variety of policies enacted in the treatment states (and in some 
control states), and we do not seek a mean effect across geography and time. 
3.1 State-level Difference-in Differences  
Consistent with the previous reports (e.g., Chinn, 2014; 2015) total nonfarm employment grew 
relatively less in Kansas and Wisconsin than in their comparison states (Figure 1) post-2011. To 
be sure, as shown in column (1) of Table 1, economic performance of Wisconsin lagged that of 
Minnesota for all but one economic indicator over the post-2011 period. For Kansas (column 
(3)), the state lagged performance of Nebraska for six of the ten economic indicators.  
Yet, as shown in columns (2) and (4), difference-in-differences (DID) estimates for the 
two periods suggest that Kansas and Wisconsin outperformed their respective comparison states 
in terms of total nonfarm employment growth. This occurs though because the pre-treatment 
declines in the two states exceeded those of the respective comparison states by greater amounts 
than by the amounts they underperformed post-2011. With the outcome values normalized to 
equal one in 2011, this is shown in Figure 1 by the lower beginning points of the outcome 
variables between the pairs of states.  
Figures 2-4 show that this also happens for Kansas-Nebraska for per capita income and 
real gross state product and for Wisconsin-Minnesota for population and real gross state product. 
In fact, across the ten economic indicators for both pairs of states, in only a few cases is there 
approximately equal economic performance during the pre-treatment period−population for 
Kansas-Nebraska and per capita income for Wisconsin-Minnesota. This leads to five and seven 
of the economic indicators favoring Wisconsin and Kansas, respectively. In the case of pre-
treatment matching of population growth between Kansas and Nebraska, the DID calculation 
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(Table 1) shows a negative effect for Kansas. This questions the efficacy of using Minnesota and 
Nebraska as comparison states for the baselines of Wisconsin and Kansas.  
3.2 Border County Difference-in-Differences 
In an attempt to control for other unmeasured characteristics, we next compute difference-in-
differences (DID) for counties along the border of each pair of comparison states. Counties along 
the border more likely share common culture, economic structure and geography and hence may 
produce better pre-treatment matches. Data are only available for eight of the indicators at the 
county level though.   
Consistent with the state-level results, Table 2 shows mixed results for the comparisons. 
Wisconsin and Kansas each fared better than their comparison state in one-half of the outcomes, 
based on using either the post-treatment changes (columns (1) and (3)) or the DID (columns (2) 
and (4)).3 Yet, also as with the state-level analysis, the large differences between most of the 
2011-2015 (2011-2014) post-treatment changes and the DID estimates reveal that the changes 
during the pre-treatment period mostly did not match closely between the border counties of the 
comparison states. This suggests that the border counties for each pair of states are not good 
matches. 
In addition, little of the economic activity in these states is located in these border 
counties. Economic activity in Kansas and Nebraska mostly lies along the major interstates. 
Except for the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, little economic activity lies along the 
border counties of Wisconsin and Minnesota; the two largest cities of Wisconsin lie in the 
interior (Madison) or on the eastern edge along Lake Michigan (Milwaukee). Two of the sixteen 
counties in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area are in Wisconsin, and would be expected 
to have different growth dynamics than the central part of the metropolitan area in Minnesota. In 
addition, potential spillovers could be even more important for border county-level DID than the 
state aggregates.  
                                                          
3
 In results not shown, using matched-border counties based on contiguity does not change signs and hardly affects 
the magnitudes. Unweighted averages were used where there were more than one contiguous county in the 
neighboring state. 
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3.3 Shift-Share Analysis 
The state- and county-level DID approaches likely do not control for growth differences that 
result from differences in industry composition. Industry composition growth differences are 
only accounted for in DID to the extent the comparison states/counties have similar industry 
structure. Differences in industry structure may explain some of the differences in pre-treatment 
growth between the pairs of comparison states. Therefore, we next apply the industry shift-share 
decomposition approach at the state level within a DID framework. 
The shift-share model separates regional employment growth into three effects: national, 
industry mix and competitive (Loveridge and Selting, 1998). The national effect accounts for 
general growth across the nation, the industry mix effect represents the growth attributable to the 
region’s (r) composition of industries (i), while the competitive effect is employment growth that 
is different from national growth and which is attributable to having a composition of industries 
growing differently than the average. In the following formulation, the national and industry mix 
effects are combined (im):  
Δimri, (t-0)=(e
r
i,0)*((%Δe
n
i,(t-0))/100).  
The sum of the industry mix effects across industries (i), including overall national growth, is the 
predicted change in regional employment from period 0 to t that is attributable to its employment 
composition of industries in time 0, which then is converted to a rate of change. The industry 
mix effect reflects employment effects of international trade shocks, national productivity shocks 
and national industry restructuring (Partridge et al., 2017) and is often used as an exogenous 
instrument for employment growth (e.g., Bartik, 1991; Moretti, 2010).  
 The results of applying DID to the decomposed shift-share BEA total employment 
growth components appear in Table 3.4 The first two columns represent the growth in 
employment that would have been predicted for the state had all its industries grown at the 
national rates for the respective period. This captures both the national growth effect and the 
                                                          
4
 Year 2014 was the last period of data availability for BEA total employment at the time of the calculations. We 
used the BEA total employment data because of its greater sector detail relative to that in the BLS QCEW data. 
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effect of a state’s composition of industries. The third and fourth columns contain the actual 
growth rates during the two periods. The fifth and sixth columns display the competitive effects, 
obtained by taking the difference between the actual and predicted growth rates. A positive 
number indicates growth that exceeds what would have been predicted by its composition of 
industries and suggests a competitive growth advantage (Loveridge and Selting, 1998). The 
seventh column displays the differences result across the two periods for the competitive 
component, in which the third and sixth rows contain the difference-in-differences estimates 
(shown in bold). 
 Wisconsin and Minnesota grew at approximately the rates predicted by their composition 
of industries during 2008-2011, as revealed by competitive growth effects close to zero. But for 
2011-2014, both states grew slower than what would have been predicted based on their industry 
composition. Wisconsin’s competitive effect was 0.79 percent lower during the 2011-2014 period 
than that of Minnesota (column 6, row 3). The corresponding DID between the two periods and 
two states for the competitiveness effect equals negative 0.55 percent (column 7, row 3), a 
slightly smaller relative decline than that reported in column (6) for the post-treatment period. 
 Kansas’ total employment declined close to the prediction for 2008-2011, while Nebraska 
total employment did not decline nearly as much as predicted. Both states though moved to 
underperforming during 2011-2014. The negative change in growth rates was greatest for 
Nebraska, producing a DID estimate of 1.26 percent total employment improvement for Kansas 
relative to Nebraska. This stands in contrast to the slightly worse competitive effect for Kansas 
during 2011-2014 (column (6)). 
 The shift-share analysis confirms the DID BEA total employment advantage for Kansas 
in Tables 1 and 2.5 But there was not a good match between Kansas and Nebraska in the 
competitive component during the pre-treatment period, again casting doubt on the predicted 
advantage for Kansas. There was a fairly good match in the competitive component between 
                                                          
5
 In the base case shown in Table 3, the 2007 employment share are used in the industry mix calculations for both 
2007-2011 and 2011-2014. Using 2007 employment shares for 2011-2014 instead of 2011 shares does not affect the 
results. 
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Wisconsin and Minnesota, suggesting that much of the poor pre-treatment fit between the two 
states is attributable to differences in industry composition. This gives validity to the negative 
0.55 percent lower DID shift-share growth in total employment growth for Wisconsin. There still 
can be other problems for matching in terms of the competitiveness effects, especially for 
Kansas-Nebraska during the pre-treatment period. The shift-share also can only be applied to 
data with industry detail. 
3.4 Synthetic Control Method Analysis   
The general lack of matching in the pre-treatment periods in the identification approaches above 
leads us to next use the Synthetic Control Method  (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al., 
2010). The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) provides a comparison unit, or synthetic control, 
that is a weighted-combination of other states. The weights applied to states that become part of 
the synthetic control are based on pre-intervention characteristics (predictor variables) in 
matching pre-intervention paths of the economic indicator variables between the state of interest 
and the synthetic control group (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al., 2010). The SCM 
has been increasingly applied at the U.S. state level (e.g., Abadie et al., 2010; Bohn et al., 2014; 
Ando, 2015; Liu, 2015; Munasib and Rickman, 2015; Eren and Ozbeklik, 2016; Luechinger and 
Roth, 2016; Rickman, Wang and Winters, 2017).6 
3.4.1 Empirical Implementation 
Construction of a synthetic control avoids the necessity of finding a “twin” for 
comparison, which can be difficult at the state level. Predictions for the synthetic control are 
obtained by multiplying the economic outcomes for the contributing states by the state weights 
and summing the values. Difference-in-differences can then be applied to the pre- and post-
treatment predictions. 
The predictor variables used in fitting the pre-intervention paths are from the regional 
science literature and were applied in SCM analysis by Munasib and Rickman (2015) and 
                                                          
6 Technical presentations of the SCM can be found in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010) and 
Munasib and Rickman (2015). 
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Rickman, Wang and Winters (2017). The predictor variables used include several produced by 
the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture: natural amenity 
scale; rural-urban continuum code; manufacturing dependence; mining dependence; farm 
dependence; persistent poverty counties; retirement destination; recreation dependence; long-
term population losses (all year 2000 or earlier). Other predictor variables used include U.S. 
Census Bureau population density in year 2000, shift-share industry mix employment growth 
four-digit level (2002-2007) (Dorfman et al., 2010), U.S. Census Bureau educational attainment 
among the adult population (25+) in year 2000 (high school completion, associate’s degree, 
bachelor’s degree or higher, Fraser’s Economic Freedom Index (Goetz et al., 2011) and 
following the convention in SCM, pre-intervention values of outcome variable (2006, 2008, 
2010). The use of industry dependence and the shift-share growth industry mix growth as 
predictor variables should help control for industry composition effects, while the other predictor 
variables also should help improve the matches compared to simply using Minnesota and 
Nebraska as comparison states in DID analysis.  
Thirty three of the lower forty eight states serve as potential donors to the synthetic 
control. Wisconsin and Kansas are eliminated as a potential donor for each other. States with 
significant energy or mining extraction during the period were removed from consideration 
because of differing cycles during the pre- and post-treatment periods related to energy price 
fluctuations: Colorado, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming. Maine and Ohio were removed because, along with Kansas 
and Wisconsin, they were among the top five states with the largest personal income tax cuts 
during the treatment period (Leachman and Mazerov, 2015). 7 Michigan was removed because of 
large business tax cuts enacted during the period.8  
                                                          
7
As presented by Leachman and Mazerov (2015), Maine’s tax cuts took effect in January 2012. The cuts in Kansas, 
Ohio and Wisconsin took effect in January 2013. Because the tax cuts were enacted well before they took effect, and 
other actions were taken, we use the first year of the governors’ terms as the treatment year. The other state with the 
largest personal income tax cut was North Carolina. But because it did not take effect until January 2014 we retained 
North Carolina as a potential donor.  
8
Source: NCSL State Tax Actions Database http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-tax-actions-
database.aspx, last accessed February 1, 2017. 
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3.4.2 Results 
As shown in Table 4, based on DID calculations for the same periods used in Table 1, 
across all but one economic indicator for Kansas, and all but two indicators for Wisconsin, 
economic performance in the synthetic control group matched or exceeded that of the respective 
treated state. This stands in contrast to the results of Table 1, where Wisconsin was compared to 
Minnesota, and Kansas was compared to Nebraska. Notably, total nonfarm QCEW employment 
grew 2.55 percent less in Kansas relative to its synthetic control and 1.34 percent less in 
Wisconsin relative to its synthetic control.9  
However, it was not that Kansas and Wisconsin performed better than Nebraska and 
Minnesota, respectively. QCEW total nonfarm employment in Kansas and Wisconsin grew 
slower post-2011 than in the respective comparison states, just not compared to the pre-treatment 
differences, suggesting poor matches for the states. With the Synthetic Control Method (SCM), 
by design the pre-treatment matches were significantly improved. 
Figures 5-8 show the SCM results for total nonfarm QCEW employment, per capita 
income, population and gross domestic product. Although both governors took office and began 
changing policy, it was not until the tax cuts were enacted and implemented did total nonfarm 
employment growth begin to lag that of the respective synthetic control, particularly for Kansas. 
Although generally matching well during the pre-treatment period, the trend in Kansas 
population flattened in 2010 (Figure 7) compared to that of the synthetic control, prior to 
Governor Brownback taking office. The trend in Kansas gross state product matched that of the 
synthetic control (Figure 8) better than it did that of Nebraska (Figure 4), but not as well as 
Wisconsin did with its synthetic control. 
Table 5 shows the weights the states received in the construction of the synthetic control 
for total nonfarm employment (columns 1 and 3) and for the average across all ten economic 
                                                          
9
 In sensitivity analysis, when Maine, Michigan and Ohio are included in the donor pool, the latter two states feature 
prominently in the construction of the synthetic control group for Wisconsin across most indicators. Yet, the results 
are mostly unchanged, where only for three economic indicators does Wisconsin outperform the synthetic control 
group. The three states do not become contributors to the synthetic control group for Kansas, leaving its results 
unchanged.  
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indicators (columns 2 and 4). In order, the states with the largest weights in the construction of 
the total nonfarm employment synthetic control for Wisconsin are Iowa, Delaware and Indiana. 
On average across all ten economic indicators the top five states for Wisconsin’s comparison 
synthetic control are Indiana, Iowa, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Vermont. Minnesota has the 
seventh largest weight, suggesting it has some relevance for comparison to Wisconsin, but not as 
the primary state of comparison. For nine of the fifteen predictor variables (not shown), the 
composite values for the synthetic control are closer to those of Wisconsin than are Minnesota’s: 
amenity scale, mining dependence, manufacturing dependence, farm dependence, population 
loss counties, recreational dependence, rural-urban continuum, bachelors’ degree and high school 
completion. 
The four states receiving weights in the construction of the total nonfarm employment 
synthetic control for Kansas in order of importance are Washington, Nebraska, Missouri and 
Alabama. On average across all ten economic indicators the top five states for Kansas’ 
comparison synthetic control are Iowa, Washington, Nebraska, South Dakota and Utah. Nebraska 
fares well as a state of comparison for Kansas, though by itself does not produce pre-treatment 
matching in the outcome variables. In fact, the composite values for the synthetic control are 
only closer to those of Kansas than are Nebraska’s in about one-half of the predictor variables: 
manufacturing dependence, farm dependence, rural-urban continuum code, associates’ degree, 
high school completion, economic freedom index and the state-industry mix employment growth 
rate for 2000-2007.10 
3.4.3 Policy Differences in Treated States versus Synthetic Control Units 
We next examine the differences in state fiscal policy between the treated states and the 
donors to the synthetic control units. Although we removed the states with the largest tax 
changes as potential donors in the construction of the synthetic controls, most states make some 
                                                          
10
 We do not conduct placebo analysis because clearly there can be differences in economic performance among the 
donor states for other reasons. Rather, our aim was in constructing efficacious comparison units for Kansas and 
Wisconsin and evaluate them in terms of differences in state fiscal policy (Section 3.4.3) 
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adjustments in taxes and expenditures each year. We compare the changes in expenditures in the 
treated states to weighted-average changes in state expenditures, in which the weights are the 
corresponding average state synthetic control unit weights from columns 2 and 4 of Table 5.11 
As shown in Figure 9, real per capita state general expenditures declined in both 
Wisconsin and Kansas relative to those of their corresponding synthetic control units. The 
respective DID calculations for Wisconsin and Kansas are -7.7 and -1.5 percent, respectively. 
This is consistent with the relatively poorer economic performance in the two states as 
attributable to changes in state fiscal policy. The relative declines began in 2011, prior to the 
implementation of tax cuts, providing additional evidence for the relative declines in economic 
performance that began in 2011, likely associated with spending cuts that preceded the tax cuts. 
The relative declines especially occur in total real per capita construction expenditures 
(Figure 10), in which the respective DID calculations for Wisconsin and Kansas are -8.7 and  
-30.8 percent. Figure 11 shows relative declines in total real per capita education expenditures. 
The DID calculations are -11.8 and -3.2 percent, respectively. The results are especially notable 
given that 2013 is the last year of data for state expenditures and the state fiscal policies were 
only getting fully implemented.  
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper assessed the effects of U.S. state fiscal austerity on state economic performance 
using the recent economic experiments in Kansas and Wisconsin. Our results suggest that rather 
than experiencing stimulative growth effects from reductions in taxes, if anything, Wisconsin and 
Kansas experienced negative economic multiplier effects from reduced state government 
spending (Chinn, 2014) and increased economic uncertainty. It remains to be seen what the long-
run economic effects of the experiments will be. But the economic experiments in Wisconsin and 
Kansas, along with those elsewhere (Arduin, Laffer and Moore Econometrics, 2011) were 
advocated as a means to stimulate growth in the short-run without having to reduced state 
                                                          
11
 State expenditures are from the Annual Survey of Government Finances: Urban Institute-
http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm.  
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government expenditures because of offsetting growth-induced tax revenue collections. In these 
two cases, the governing parties appeared to negatively affect their economies in the short run. 
Internationally, the International Monetary Fund likewise admits underestimating the negative 
multiplier effects of fiscal austerity on European economies (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).  
The study also points to the perils of comparing state economic performance to that of its 
neighbors. Although the relatively poorer performance of Wisconsin relative to Minnesota and 
Kansas to Nebraska reported in the media post-2011 generally holds up in the synthetic control 
analysis, state- and county-level DID analysis in this study suggests that the two pairs were not 
sufficiently efficacious matches. We also conclude that following Partridge and Rickman (1999), 
multiple indicators should be examined. Not all aspects of the state economies appear to have 
been uniformly affected by the policy changes. 
Future research will be needed to evaluate the long-term effects of the Kansas and 
Wisconsin experiments. But short-term budget difficulties may lead the states to reverse course 
and raise some taxes (Carpenter, 2017). The long-term evaluation then may be in terms of 
disruption and volatility rather than a consistent long-run move in a definitive ideological 
direction.   
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Table 1. State-Level Difference-in-Differences (2015-2011 vs 2011-2007) 
 WI-MN 
2011-2015 
(1) 
WI-MN 
DID 
(2) 
KS-NE 
2011-2015 
(3) 
KS-NE 
DID 
(4) 
Total Nonfarm Emp. -1.29% 0.1%* -1.13% 1.01%* 
Per Capita Income -0.08% 0.26%* -1.36% 0.72%* 
Real GSP -2.88% -1.4% -6.71% -1.59% 
Population -1.62% -0.06% -1.54% -1.34% 
BEA Total Emp.
a
 -0.8% 0.36%* 0.24%* 1.91%* 
Unemployment Rate -0.4%* -1.4%* -0.9%* -1.8%* 
LF/Population -0.05% 0.61%* 1.14%* 2.95%* 
Median HH Income
a
 -3.98% -1.03% 2.3%* 6.7%* 
Poverty Rate
a
 0.5% 0.1% 0.3% -0.1%* 
Housing Price -11.96% -23.32% -5.98% -3.83% 
a 
Because of data availability 2008-2011 and 2011-2014 were the periods used in the calculations 
* Indicates Wisconsin/Kansas with the preferred outcome 
 
 
Table 2. Border County Difference-in-Differences 
  WI-MN 
2011-2015 
(1) 
WI-MN 
DID 
(2) 
KS-NE 
2011-2015 
(3) 
KS-NE 
DID 
(4) 
Total Nonfarm Emp. -1.56% -2.59% -1.29% -0.66% 
Per Capita Income 0.69%* -0.11% -9.80% -17.75% 
Population 3.62%* 3.96%* 0.77%* -0.60% 
BEA Total Emp.a -0.71% -0.94% 0.53* 4.36%* 
Unemployment Rate 0.23% -0.21%* 0.21% 0.30% 
LF/Population -0.2% -1.62% -0.75% 1.95%* 
Median Incomea 0.94* 4.93%* 1.46* 6.18%* 
Poverty Ratea -0.17* -0.58%* -0.06* -0.02%* 
a 
Because of data availability 2008-2011 and 2011-2014 were the periods used in the calculations 
* Indicates Wisconsin/Kansas with the preferred outcome 
  
21 
 
Table 3. Shift-Share Difference-in-Differences Results  
 
Predicted (%) 
(Industry Mix Effect) Actual (%) 
Actual-Predicted (%) 
(Competitive Effect)  DID (%) 
 2008-2011 
(1) 
2011-2014 
(2) 
2008-2011 
(3) 
2011-2014 
(4) 
2008-2011 
(5) 
2011-2014 
(6) 
Post-Pre 
(7) 
MN -1.99 5.29 -1.84 3.87 0.15 -1.42 -1.57 
WI -2.87 5.32 -2.96 3.11 -0.09 -2.21 -2.12 
WI-MN -0.88 0.03 -1.12 -0.76 -0.24 -0.79 -0.55 
KS -2.2 5.45 -2.22 4.25 -0.02 -1.2 -1.18 
NE -2 5 -0.57 3.99 1.43 -1.01 -2.44 
KS-NE -0.2 0.45 -1.65 0.26 -1.45 -0.19 1.26 
US -1.87 5.4 -1.87 5.4 0 0 0 
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Table 4. State-Level SCM Difference-in-Differences 
 Wisconsin-Synthetic Kansas-Synthetic 
Total Nonfarm W&S Emp. -1.34% -2.55% 
Per Capita Income 1.63%* -0.25% 
Real Gross State Product 0.13%* -7.82% 
Population -0.00% -0.95% 
BEA Total Employment -0.20% -0.67% 
Unemployment Rate 0.45% 0.13% 
Labor Force/Population -0.55% -0.79% 
Median Household Income -0.78% 2.67%* 
Poverty Rate 0.62% 0.11% 
Housing Price -6.60% -1.17% 
* Indicates Wisconsin/Kansas with the preferred outcome 
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Table 5. Synthetic Control State Weights 
State Wisconsin-QCEW 
(1) 
Wisconsin-Average 
(2) 
Kansas-QCEW 
(3) 
Kansas-Average 
(4) 
AL 0.068 0.042 0.106 0.014 
AZ 0.042 0.004 0 0.005 
AR 0 0.001 0 0.011 
CA 0 0 0 0.012 
CT 0 0 0 0.006 
DE 0.363 0.074 0 0 
FL 0.007 0.001 0 0 
GA 0 0.010 0 0.001 
ID 0 0.031 0 0.014 
IL 0 0.032 0 0.008 
IN 0.13 0.225 0 0.035 
IA 0.378 0.117 0 0.235 
KY 0 0.005 0 0.003 
MD 0 0.007 0 0 
MA 0 0 0 0 
MN 0 0.052 0 0.001 
MS 0 0.003 0 0 
MO 0 0.032 0.155 0.016 
NE 0 0 0.339 0.153 
NH 0 0.047 0 0.064 
NJ 0 0 0 0 
NY 0 0.011 0 0 
NC 0 0 0 0.007 
OR 0 0 0 0 
PA 0.004 0.073 0 0.001 
RI 0 0.051 0 0 
SC 0 0.040 0 0.001 
SD 0 0.009 0 0.119 
TN 0 0.019 0 0.002 
UT 0 0 0 0.082 
VT 0.007 0.063 0 0 
VA 0 0 0 0.034 
WA 0 0.053 0.4 0.178 
Note: columns sums may not equal 1 due to rounding
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Figure 1. Difference-in Differences Annual Average BLS Total Nonfarm Employment (QCEW) (treatment year: 2011=1) 
 
Figure 2. Difference-in Differences BEA Per Capita Income (treatment year: 2011=1) 
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Figure 3. Difference-in Differences Census Population (treatment year: 2011=1) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Difference-in Differences Real Gross State Product (treatment year: 2011=1) 
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Figure 5. Synthetic Control Annual Average BLS Total Nonfarm Employment (QCEW) (treatment year: 2011=1) 
 
  
Figure 6. Synthetic Control Per Capita Income (treatment year: 2011=1)  
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Figure 7. Synthetic Control Population (treatment year: 2011=1)  
 
  
Figure 8. Synthetic Control Real Gross State Product (treatment year: 2011=1)  
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Figure 9. Real Per Capita General State and Local Expenditures (Annual Survey of Government Finances) (treatment year: 2011=1)  
 
  
Figure 10. Real Per Capita Total Construction Expenditures (Annual Survey of Government Finances) (treatment year: 2011=1)  
  
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
WI-SYN WI
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
KS-SYN KS
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
WI-SYN WI
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
KS-SYN KS
29 
 
 
Figure 11. Real Per Capita Total Education Expenditures (Annual Survey of Government Finances) (treatment year: 2011=1)  
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